Electoral Design, Party Competition and Institutional Weakness in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Causal Mechanisms Shaping a Fragile Democracy

Abstract

This article analyses how electoral design, party competition and intra-party practices shape democratic fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ethnic voting and the dominance of national parties originated with the 1990 elections and the narrative of the “agreement of peoples”, later reinforced through the post-Dayton institutional structure. Using a conceptual approach and a within-case analysis, the article draws on academic literature, constitutional rules, European Court of Human Rights judgments, election-monitoring reports and the author’s earlier research. It identifies mechanisms through which electoral rules strengthen competition within ethnic blocs, while proportional representation functions inside an ethnically segmented framework that encourages patronage and limits programmatic politics. Weak intra-party democracy further concentrates power among party elites and undermines state institutions. The article proposes adjustments to electoral design, the political institutions and intra-party procedures, explaining how these steps could ease incentives for ethnic voting and reinforce institutional capacity.